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Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, this study
(N = 1,504) showed that about half the EITC eligible tax filers in 2001 did
not file EITC tax returns and that differences between EITC tax filers and
non-EITC tax filers varied by birth place, Food Stamp program participation, maritalstatus, race,residence, sex, socioeconomichistory, and worker
classification.Findingssuggested that the EITC is well targetedin the sense
that economically marginalized groups are likely to participateand that
increased outreach efforts are also needed to ensure greater participation
among tax filers eligible for the EITC but who are less likely to claim it,
especially self-employed persons and those residing in the Northeast.
Keywords: Earned income tax credit (EITC), poverty, social policy, tax
policy, welfare reform

The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is one of the most
significant cash-transfer programs for low-income families in the
United States. It serves single and/or married individuals, with
or without children, as long as they meet income eligibility. The
EITC offsets in part the erosion of Federal responsibility to poor
families, formalized by the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 which ended the entitlement nature of means-tested cash-based welfare provision (Bok &
Simmons, 2002; Careley, 1996; Ozawa, 1995). EITC expenditures
exceed those of Food Stamps and the Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) program, although they fall shy of the
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. Although the EITC
currently targets working poor individuals regardless of whether
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, March, 2006, Volume XXXIII, Number 1

10

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

they have children, it lifts more children out of poverty than any
other means-tested or social insurance program (U.S. Congress,
2004b, 2004c). It raises the income of many low-income workers
above the poverty line, increases labor force participation among
low-income single mothers, and enables many low-income families in general to meet immediate consumption as well as longerterm investment needs (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities,
1998).
Despite some misgivings in regard to compliance, the EITC
has enjoyed bi-partisan political support since its inception in
1975 when it was viewed as a means of providing an offset
to Social Security (payroll) taxes paid by low-income workers
with children. It retains a pro-work, pro-family, and anti-welfare
appeal that both Republican and Democratic presidential administrations have used to justify the 30-year Federal subsidy to lowincome families. The EITC has become one of the main Federal
programs to subsidize the working poor, to provide an economic
incentive to retain their labor force attachment, and thereby to
decrease their likelihood of remaining in poverty and of relying
on TANF, Food Stamps, and other forms of public assistance.
This paper provides an overview of the EITC program and it
reports results of a study that examined the likelihood of EITC
participation among eligible taxpayers in 2001. The comparison
between eligible participants and non-participants should provide insight into why some eligible households fail to claim the
credit and help increase the effectiveness of EITC outreach efforts.
Literature Review
About the EITC
The EITC is one of nine major means-tested programs. The
others are Food Stamps, Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income
(SSI), TANF, the child support enforcement program, programs
subsidizing child care, housing programs, and employment and
training programs. The EITC is a unique means-tested program
because it is a refundable tax credit. That is, if the amount of
the credit exceeds the taxpayer's Federal income tax liability, the
excess is payable to the taxpayer as a direct transfer payment.
As a transfer payment, the EITC is like other Federal programs

The Earned Income Tax Credit

11

that provide poor and low-income families with public benefits.
Since it requires earnings, the EITC is unique from other Federal
benefit programs (U.S. Congress, 2004c). As a tax expenditure,
the EITC is like the deduction of home mortgage interest (HMI)
and the exclusion of employer pension (EPP) contributions from
income, the two largest and best-known tax expenditures, which,
however, are not means-tested (Holtzblatt, 2000). Howard (1997)
provides a useful guide to the historical and political precedents
of tax expenditures with social policy objectives, including the
targeted jobs tax credit (TJTC), in addition to the EITC, HMI, and
EPP. Weisbach and Nussim (2004) provide a more technical discussion of organizational and institutional design issues relevant
to an integration of tax and spending programs.
Enacted during the Ford administration in 1975 as a way to
offset the burden of Social Security tax on low-income working parents, the EITC generally equals a specified percentage of
wages up to a maximum dollar amount. The maximum amount
applies over a certain range of income and diminishes to zero
over a certain income range. The EITC thereby has three ranges:
phase-in, maximum credit, and phase-out. In the phase-in range,
the EITC acts as a wage subsidy-as the family earns more, the
transfer increases. In the maximum credit range, the transfer
remains constant regardless of earnings. In the phase-out range,
the EITC acts like a negative income tax-as the family earns
more, the transfer is reduced. While the phase-in range provides
a work incentive, the maximum and phase-out ranges have work
disincentives for some families (Horowitz, 2002; see Moffitt (2003)
for a history of the negative income tax in U.S. welfare policy).
The income ranges and percentages have increased several times
since 1975, expanding the credit, as have the numbers of participants. The 1975-2003 EITC parameters can be found in U.S.
Congress (2004c); the corresponding number of recipient families
and amount of credits can be found in U.S. Congress (2004b). It
should be noted that unlike public assistance programs in some
states, single-parent and two-parent families with similar income
levels receive the same EITC benefit. Additionally, two-parent
families with similar income levels receive the same EITC benefit
regardless of whether one or both parents work (Greenstein &
Shapiro, 1998).
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It is also important to keep in mind that throughout the
1980s and 1990s the AFDC program was increasingly subjected
to arguable criticism for sustaining, if not also creating, a class
of "dependent" poor able-bodied persons, especially unmarried
women with children. Ending welfare dependency had come to
displace poverty reduction as a major social problem. Macroeconomic factors as causally relevant to the plight of poor persons in
general and of poor mothers in particular were virtually drowned
out or ignored in the policy debates about welfare. Poor mothers
with young children were no longer considered "deserving" and
the legitimacy of claims for cash assistance had eroded, aided in
part by sustained attacks on the U.S. welfare state in general and
on the AFDC program in particular since the early 1980s (Bowen,
Desimone, & McKay, 1995; Caputo, 1997a, 1997b; Ellwood, 2000a;
Handler, 1995; Hoynes, 1995).
Rules to tighten eligibility compliance and to improve enforcement of the EITC were incorporated into the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Act of 1996, the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997, and the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, each
during the Clinton administration. It should also be kept in mind
that the minimum wage, an alternative mechanism to raise the
income of low-income workers, was increased to $5.15 in 1997
and that the EITC had been found to deliver a much larger
proportion of a given dollar of benefits to low-income workers
between 1989 and 1992 than increases in the minimum wage from
$3.35 to $4.25 (Burkhauser, Couch, & Glenn, 1995). The Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, the GW Bush
administration's tax cut package, increased the beginning and
ending amounts of the phase-out ranges for married taxpayers
who filed a joint return and, among other provisions expanding the potential reach of EITC in general, excluded nontaxable
employee compensation from the definition of earned income
(Gale & Potter, 2002; Kiefer, D., et al., 2002; Smeeding, Ross, &
O'Connor, 2000; U.S. Congress, 2004c). The three benefit formulas (for no children, one child, and two or more children) have
remained in place since 1994 and the subsidy rate stabilized at 40
percent in 1997 (See U.S. Congress, 2004c). Although the levels
have changed, Ozawa and Hong (2003) reported that a modified
formula which included an additional category for three or more
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children with a subsidy rate of 46 percent would significantly
reduce the poverty rates of children. This would be the case more
so when combined with the child allowances that were part of
the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001.1
Priorstudies of EITC

In addition to documenting the broad ideological support
for the EITC, Greenstein and Shapiro (1998) and the Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities (1998) have summarized much of
the earlier research of its use and effects (Also see Blank, Card, &
Robbins, 1999; Essa & Hoynes, 1999). More than half the increase
in the proportion of single mothers in the labor force was found
to be due to the effects of the EITC, especially those occurring
after the expansion of maximum credit benefits in 1993 (Also,
see Blank, 2000; Ellwood, 2000a & 2000b). The EITC was also
found to offset between one-fourth and one-third of the decline
in the national share of income received by the poorest fifth of
households with children over a twenty-year period. It reduced
poverty among children by one-fourth. U.S. Census data revealed
that the EITC moved more children out of poverty than any other
program or category of programs. This was especially the case
among Hispanic children as well as among children in the South,
where lower wages prevail and more low-income workers are
likely to qualify.
More recent data showed that in 2002 the anti-poverty effectiveness of the EITC and Federal taxes removed roughly the same
percentage of persons from poverty as Social Insurance (10.9%
vs. 11.7% respectively) and higher percentages than means-tested
non-cash programs (9.7%) and means-tested cash programs
(3.5%). These percentages were a striking contrast to the 1979
figures of 15.3% for means-test non-cash programs, 10.9% for
Social Insurance, 7.7% for means-tested cash program, and -1.6%
for EITC and Federal taxes. The last, negative, percent was due
to the regressive nature of the Social Security (payroll) tax which
the EITC did not fully offset in the aggregate until 1993 (U.S.
Congress, 2004a). Relying on data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the years 1975-1992, Horowitz (2002)
reported that eligible EITC households were mobile and that most
spells were short. Among those who were just starting a spell, 51
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percent of spells lasted one year and 74 percent of spells were
over in two years or less. Only 9 percent of spells lasted five years
or longer. The average spell was 2.135 years.
Several of the earlier EITC studies focused on marriage penalties and bonuses, which are not the main foci of the present study
Suffice it to say for present purposes that research on taxes in general had consistently indicated that as the tax penalty on marriage
increased, individuals were less likely to marry and more likely to
divorce (Alm, Dickert-Conlin, & Whittington, 1999). The phasein and phase-out levels of the EITC were thought to penalize
married women who worked and to subsidize married women
who did not work, thereby distorting marriage decisions and married women's labor force participation decisions (Dickert-Conlin
& Houser, 2002). The EITC structure also implied that a single
mother with no earnings who married a man with low earnings
would qualify for the subsidy, thus providing a marriage subsidy;
however, an EITC-eligible mother would become ineligible if
she married and their combined income placed them beyond
the phase-out range (Dickert-Conlin & Houser, 1999. Also, see
Ellwood, 2000a&b; Holtzblatt & Rebelein, 2000).
Phillips (2001) noted that since the EITC is administered
through the Federal tax system its use was contingent on how
knowledgeable low-income taxpayers and likely taxpayers were
about it. Relying on data from the 1999 National Survey of America's Families (NSAF), Phillips showed that knowledge about and
use of the EITC varied by a number of sociodemographic characteristics. Nearly two-thirds of parents from the NSAF sample had
heard of the EITC and nearly 30 percent had received it at some
time. Low-income Hispanic parents were less knowledgeable
about the program than low-income non-Hispanic parents of
any race. In addition, among knowledgeable low-income parents,
Hispanic parents were less likely to receive the credit. Married
low-income parents were less likely than divorced/separated
and never married parents to know about or receive the EITC.
Divorced/separated parents were less likely than all parents to
have ever used the program. Parents who had a history of welfare
receipt had greater knowledge of EITC than were those with no
such history. Whether or not a state implemented its own EITC
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program was found to have no effect on either knowledge or use
of the Federal program.
Relying on 1990 SIPP data, Scholz (1994) found that higher
income taxpayers were more likely to file returns among EITC
eligible persons than lower-income taxpayers, although greater
levels of income derived from self-employment decreased the
likelihood of EITC participation. In addition, the likelihood of
EITC participation among eligible tax filers was positively related
to the size of the potential EITC payment. Taxpayer characteristics
associated with non-participation included AFDC participation,
Social Security participation, larger family size, being unmarried,
being male, and being of Spanish origin. Those with college degrees were also less likely to participate than were those without
high school diplomas. Those in private household occupations
such as launderers, cooks, housekeepers, and child care workers,
as well as equipment cleaners, helpers, and laborers were less
likely to receive the EITC than were executives, managers, and
those working in specialty professional occupations.
Finally, as the preceding survey of the literature indicates,
most studies of the EITC relied on micro-level data and drew
conclusions about individual responses to the program's incentive structure, especially in regard to marriage, work, and welfare.
A notable exception, which goes beyond the scope of the present
study, is Edwards (2004) who reported that the EITC is a better
fiscal stimulus tool than broad-based tax refunds.
The aforementioned micro-level studies suggested that the
EITC is a well-known and well-targeted program that works.
Specific subgroups of the population, however, especially Hispanic parents, were reported to be less likely to know about
and hence to use EITC. The present study sought to add to the
knowledge base of EITC in several ways. It included single lowincome workers without children, as well as those with children.
The present study took into account past tax filing behavior,
which prior studies have omitted. The assumption here was that
persons with a history of not filing taxes would probably be less
likely to use the EITC. The present study also took advantage
of longitudinal panel data by making use of family background
items and cumulative measures of income status and work history obtained at the time of interview rather than relying on
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respondents' recall of such measures as is the case in retrospective
cross-sectional EITC studies. For example, it includes measures of
work history because evidence suggested that the EITC induces
labor market entry in families that do not initially have an adult
worker (Neumark & Wascher, 2001). Hence a hypothesized positive relationship between EITC receipt and work history might be
somewhat offset by those with weak to moderate work histories
who might be EITC-eligible but perhaps not apply. Results were
meant to further the outreach efforts of the Federal government
and advocacy groups. The author thought that it was important
to continue to monitor the use of the EITC to ensure that it remains
a well-targeted and effective program and by extension, stands
a reasonable probability of surviving at a time when reduction
of the Federal deficit may necessitate tax increases to offset lost
tax revenue from the EITC despite the efforts of the anti-tax, antiwelfare G.W. Bush administration.
Method
Data and Subjects
Data were obtained from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY), a nationally representative sample of 12,686 young
men and women who were 14-22 years old when they were first
surveyed in 1979. In 2002, the most recent year of available data,
there were 7,724 respondents, representing 60.9 percent of the
original sample. The primary purpose of the NLSY was collection of data on each respondent's labor force experiences, labor
market attachment, and investments in education and training.
The NLSY was deemed suitable for purposes of the present study
because it asked questions about tax-filing behavior in general
and about the EITC in particular (Center for Human Resource
Research, 2004).
Reliance on the NLSY as the single source of data was not seen
as problematic in light of the battery of significant legislative measures designed to curb the types of errors identified by IRS and
other studies (Alstott, 1994; Greenstein & Shapiro, 1998; Kiefer,
et al., 2002; McCubbin, 2000). In addition, Federal and advocacy
efforts inform low-income persons about the program and about
free tax preparation services, so public awareness is likely to have
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increased significantly since the time of earlier studies and reports
(e.g., see Shipler, 2004). Furthermore, questions about the EITC
were raised after respondents were asked about whether they
filed taxes in the previous calendar year, a question that had been
asked in prior survey years. Nonetheless, several limitations of
the NLSY are of note. The 39 percent attrition rate invariably
fell disproportionately on the lower income individuals and their
families. The NLSY also represented only one cohort of the U.S.
population first surveyed in 1979 and hence this study excludes
more recent cohorts of young families, which regarding poverty,
are of interest. Study findings and implications are presented and
discussed with these limitations in mind.
Measures
EITC eligibility:To be eligible for EITC in 2001, federal guidelines required that a respondent had to live in a household with
reported regular/military income less than or equal to $4,760 with
no children, $7,140 with one child, and $10,020 with more than
one child (U.S. Congress, 2004c, Table 13-12). The determination
of EITC eligibility was made mechanically at the time of interview
by the survey software on the basis of respondents' responses to
"lead-in" questions about sources of income, household composition (specifically for the presence of a spouse), whether any
biological children had ever been reported, and whether they
filed tax forms for 2001 (McClaskie, 2005). Since this procedure in
all likelihood resulted in an over-count of persons eligible for the
EITC, the presence of children was determined from household
composition items in the NLSY79. The study sample included
only those respondents who had been determined EITC eligible
by the mechanical method and about whom all other information
was available.
Sociodemographiccharacteristics:These included age, education
(highest grade completed), ethnicity (Hispanic vs. other), health
status (whether health limited the amount or type of work one
could do), marital status (married [reference category in multivariate analysis], never married, or separated/widowed/divorced), number of children in household, residence (urban vs.
rural), race (White vs. other), SES history (the number of years
respondents lived in families whose incomes fell below official
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poverty lines that accounted for family size), and sex. Background
control measures included country of birth (US born vs. other)
and mother's education, region of residence (Northeast, North
Central, South, or West).
Class of worker: This measure comprised a series of dummy
variables. It signified whether respondents were employed by
government, private for profit companies, non-profit organizations (including tax-exempt and charitable), or family businesses
(including self-employed).
Work history and related measures: Work history was captured
by three measures: the average number of weeks worked per year
between 1979 and 2000, the average number of week unemployed
(vis-A-vis out of the labor force) per year between 1979 and 2000,
and the number of weeks worked in calendar year 2001. In addition, the percentage unemployed in the area in which respondents
lived was included because, as Ellwood (2000a) notes, reforms
designed to support people who are working fail if people cannot find work. This measure was used as a control. Finally, the
average annual percent of weeks unaccounted for in the NLSY
in accounting for weeks worked was also included as a control
variable.
Public Assistance Use: The public assistance measures included
whether respondents reported they participated in the Food
Stamps, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) programs. Each measure
was coded such that 1=Yes, 0=No. Since the income eligibility
thresholds are higher for Food Stamps and SSI than for TANF,
participation in EITC was thought to be more likely for Food
Stamp and SSI recipients.
Results
Nearly half (49%) the eligible taxpayers in the study sample
filed for the EITC. As can be seen in Table 1, EITC filing status
differed by age, class of worker, country of birth, marital status,
mother's education, public assistance receipt, race, region of residence, SES history, sex, and work history. As Panel A shows,
EITC tax filers were younger than non-EITC tax filers (40.7 vs.
41.1 years old), less educated mothers (9.9 vs. 10.3 years of completed schooling), lived in poor families for a greater number
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Table 1
Panel A
T-test results by EITC Tax Filing Status
EITC Tax FilingStatus
Measure
Sociodemographic Measures
Age
Education
Mother's education
Number of children in household
Number of years filed tax return
Number of years lived in poverty
Work history measures
Average number of weeks worked
Average percent of unaccounted
number of weeks worked, 1982-2000
Number of weeks worked in 2001
Percent of unaccounted number of
weeks worked in 2001
Unemployment rate in area of residence

EITC Tax Non-EITC
Filer
Tax Filer

T-value

40.69
12.27
9.90
1.65
4.83
5.52

41.06
12.46
10.29
0.93
4.82
3.44

-3.18**
-1.81
-2.32*
11.22***
0.16
9.96***

31.50
38.97

34.80
51.54

-4.78***
-1.42

44.95
19.54

43.57
34.59

1.81
-0.60

2.74

2.67

1.69

***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

of years (5.5 vs. 3.4), and on average worked fewer weeks per

year between 1982 and 2000 (31.5 vs. 34.8). As Panel B shows,
higher percentages of those born in the U.S. (94.9% vs. 92.5%),

separated/divorced/widowed (49.3% vs. 32.4%), female (71.6%
vs. 46.9), government employees (17.2% vs. 12.7%), Food Stamp
recipients (9.8% vs. 2.2%), and TANF recipients (1.9% vs. 0.5%)
were EITC tax filers than were non-EITC tax filers. Higher percentages of those married (43.7% vs. 28.3%), White (57.3% vs.
48.2%), Northeast residents (15.7% vs. 9.8%), and self-employed
or in family businesses (15.0% vs. 7.4%) were non-EITC tax filers
than were EITC tax filers.
As can be seen in Table 2, country of birth, marital status,
number of children in household, number of years as a tax filer,
number of years lived in a poor family, region of residence, sex,
class or worker, use of public assistance, and work history were
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Table 1 (continued)
Panel B
Cross Tabulation Results by EITC EligibilityStatus
(within group percent)
EITC Tax Filing Status
Measure
Sociodemographic Measures
Born in the U.S.
Health limits work on can do
Hispanic
Marital Status
Married
Never married
Separated/divorced/widowed
Race-White
Region of residence
Northeast
North Central
South
West
Sex-Female
Urban residence
Class of worker status
Government employee
Private, for profit sector
employee
Non-profit organization
employee
Self-employed or family business
Public Assistance Participation
Food Stamps
SSI
TANF
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

EITC Tax
Filer

Non-EITC
Tax Filer

Chi-square
value
03.84*
00.03
00.63
38.47***
00.51
44.67***
12.30***
11.45**
00.02
04.02*
00.03
94.65***
00.00
06.05*
00.44

7.0

5.4

7.4

15.0

01.51
21.93***
39.33***
00.38
06.19*

The Earned Income Tax Credit
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Table 2
UnstandardizedCoefficients (B), Standard Errors (SE), and Odds of
Filing for the EITC
Measures
Sociodemographic Measures
Age
Born in the U.S.
Education
Health limits work on can do
Hispanic
Marital Status
Married (reference)
Never married
Separated/divorced/widowed
Mother's education
Number of children in household
Number of years filed tax return
Number of years lived in poverty
Race-White
Region of residence
Northeast
North Central
South (reference)
West
Sex-Female
Urban residence
Class of worker status
Government employee
Private, for profit sector employee
Non-profit organization employee
Self-employed or family business
(reference)
Public Assistance Participation
Food Stamps
SSI
TANF
Work history measures
Average annual # of weeks worked,
1982-2000

Odds Ratio

B

SE

-. 037
.611
-. 037
.058
-. 060

.027
.277
.035
.186
.209

.964
1.843*
.964
1.060
.941

.491
1.068
-. 012
.537
.103
.099
-. 171

.181
.146
.023
.055
.048
.019
.141

1.633**
2.909***
.988
1.711***
1.108*
1.104***
.843

-. 476
-.238

.197
.170

.621*
.788

-. 001
.664
.038

.208
.133
.151

.999
1.942***
1.038

.662
.576
.727

.251
.207
.308

1.938**
1.778**
2.068*

1.136
-. 229
.193

.329
.397
.661

3.113***
.795
1.212

.004

.006

1.004
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Measures
Average % unaccounted # of weeks
worked, 1982-2000
Number of weeks worked in 2001
Percent unaccounted # of weeks worked
in 2001
Unemployment rate in area of residence
-2 Log likelihood
Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness of Fit
Test
***p

.001, **p

B

SE

-. 035

.037

.965

.010
.003

.004
.014

1.010*
1.003

Odds Ratio

.129

.088
1.138
1703.316
Chi-square=3.35, df=8, p=.91

.01, *p < .05

robust correlates of EITC tax filing status. When accounting for all
study measures, those more likely to file for the EITC were born
in the U.S. (1.8 times as likely), never married vs. married (1.6
times), separated/divorced/widowed vs. married (2.9 times),
women (1.9 times), government employees vs. self-employed (1.9
times), private for profit sector employees vs. self-employed (1.8
times), non-profit organization employees (2.1 times), and Food
Stamp recipients (3.1 times). Also, each increase in the number
of children in a household increased the odds of filing for the
EITC by 71 percent, while each additional year of being a tax filer
increased the odds of filing for the EITC by 11 percent, of living
in a poor family by 10 percent, and of working each additional
week by 1.0 percent. Residence in the Northeast US decreased the
odds of filing for the EITC by 38% in comparison to residence in
the South.
Discussion
Findings of this study suggest that the EITC remains an
increasingly well-targeted program. Food Stamp recipients, women, those with greater numbers of children, and separated/divorced/widowed persons are more likely than their low-income
tax filing counterparts to participate in the EITC. These findings
are consistent with much prior research (e.g., Blank, 2000; Blank,
Card, & Robbins, 1999; Center on Budget and Policy Priorities,
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1998; Ellwood, 2000a & 2000b; Essa & Hoynes, 1999; Greenstein &
Shapiro, 1998). Corroboration of previous research demonstrating
the well-targeted nature of the EITC is important for policy makers and EITC advocates to know. If nothing else, it signifies that
government policy based on work-related incentives can work
as intended to the benefit of low-income individuals and their
families. Furthermore, as Alstott (1999) shows, the EITC has to
compete with other federal wage subsidy schemes that go directly
to employers rather than to individuals (e.g., the Welfare-to-Work
Tax Credit launched during the Clinton administration) and it has
several competitive advantages over such tax credit programs
that can hold up under empirical scrutiny. For example, the EITC
is more likely than wage subsidies that go to employers to bring
non-employed persons into the labor market and to increase the
amount of work that part-time workers do.
Findings of this study differ somewhat from Phillips (2001)
who reported that divorced/separated parents were less likely
than all parents to have ever used the program and that Hispanics were less likely than others to know about or participate in the EITC. The disparate findings are probably an artifact
of different samples. The present study shows that low-income
married people were less likely to receive EITC. Alternatively,
greater outreach efforts by the Federal government and community groups in the late 1990s and early 2000s as noted below may
have also contributed to different findings. Both the present study
and Phillips, however, show that married low-income persons
and parents respectively are less likely than never married and
divorced/separated persons and parents to receive the EITC.
On the whole, findings of the present study as well as those of
Phillips and others suggest that the EITC rewards economically
marginalized groups of working taxpayers with a greater level of
income than would be the case otherwise. In doing so, the EITC
continues to serve the purposes of social justice by expanding the
opportunity set among those families whose economic circumstances are precarious at best (Barry, 2005).
Findings of the present study also suggest that increased
outreach efforts are also needed to ensure greater participation
among those eligible for the EITC. This is especially the case
for married persons, those who file tax returns less frequently
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over the years, and corroborating Scholz (1994), those who are
self-employed or work for a family business. In 2001 married
persons may have been reluctant to file due to purported penalty
effects reported in prior research if filing would make them worse
off than not filing for the EITC (Dickert-Conlin & Houser, 1999;
Ellwood, 2000a&b; Holtzblatt & Rebelein, 2000). To the extent
the EITC is perceived as rewarding married parents less than
others, especially never married, separated, or divorced parents,
its political popularity with both Democratic and Republican
politicians and other policy makers may erode despite the program's pro-work emphasis. The EITC might suffer the same fate
as AFDC did in 1996 when, as previously noted, it was replaced
with TANF (Bowen, Desimone, & McKay, 1995; Ellwood, 2000a;
Fraser & Gordon, 1994; Handler, 1995; Haveman & Scholz, 1994).
Also as noted however, prior to 2002 persons with "married
filing separate" status were ineligible for the EITC. Separate filing
status may remove the marriage penalty for many couples and
their families and thereby enable them to benefit from the EITC
program. In addition, married joint tax filers after 2001 should
also benefit from the increased beginning and ending amounts of
the phase-out ranges for married taxpayers who file a joint return
as enacted in the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2001. The effects of such legislation on the EITC takeup rate for low-income married couples warrant future research.
When providing services to low-income working families, social
workers and other professionals should be aware of the EITC
eligibility criteria and how they might affect married couples as
tax filers.
Information about the EITC can be found at the Internal
Revenue Service Internet site (http://www.irs.gov/individuals/
article/0,,id=96406,00.html). When no economically adverse consequences are likely to follow, couples should be encouraged to
pursue the EITC when filing their taxes and to have an assessment done to determine the effects of filing taxes as a couple or
as individuals. If they do not already do so, social and family
service agencies with low-income working clients may consider
incorporating financial counseling to their mix of services with
the EITC in mind. This can be done by ensuring that professional
providing psychotherapeutic counseling or other interpersonal

The Earned Income Tax Credit

25

services expand their clinical treatment regimen and attend more
explicitly than might be the case otherwise to their clients' socioeconomic well-being. It can also be done by offering "concrete"
financial counseling services whose practitioners are well-versed
in public programs targeting low-income individuals and families. At the least, low-income working clients ($36,000 and below)
can be directed to the Volunteer Income Tax Assistance program
(VITA), whose local sites can be obtained by calling 1-800-8291040. Low-income working elderly clients (60 years and over) can
be directed to the Tax Counseling for the Elderly program (TCE),
of which the AARP's Tax-Aide program is a part. Information
about TCE can be found at 1-800-829-1040, while information
about AARP's Tax-Aide program can be found at 1-888-227-7669
or by visiting the AARP Internet site (http://www.aarp.org/
money/taxaide/).
As noted, among eligible taxpayers those who file tax returns
less frequently, as well as those who are self-employed or work
for a family business, are also less likely to file tax returns for the
EITC. Apparently offers of free tax preparation services in lowincome neighborhoods and on the Internet fail to capture these
two groups of individual taxpayers who can benefit from filing
for the EITC. Social service agencies that provide individual and
family financial counseling services might pay closer attention
to the tax-filing histories and self-employment status of their
otherwise EITC-eligible clients and make sure they understand
that they are both eligible for the EITC and that it is to their
economic advantage file for it, especially for families with two
low-income workers who could benefit from filing their tax forms
separately.
In conclusion, this study adds to the body of knowledge
about the EITC, a program that remains well-targeted. It identifies groups of individual taxpayers whom social workers and
other professionals working with low-income working clients
can benefit from participation in the EITC program. Several free
tax preparation services are also identified so clients can locate
nearby offices to help them determine their eligibility and to file
tax returns accordingly. Future research should explore to what
extent the EITC provides a boost for those who are already on their
way escaping poverty, and to discern the proportions of families
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who fall below qualifying for the credit, who are helped but still
destitute, and who make it beyond what might be considered an
acceptable economic marker, such as 150-200 percent of the poverty line. As noted above, future research should also determine
the effects of related legislation passed in 2002 and in 2001.
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Note
1. It should also be kept in mind that prior to 2002 low-income taxpayers with
a "married filing separate" status were ineligible for the credit. As Holtzblatt
and Rebelein (2000) have shown, this policy created a bonus for two very
low-wage workers with children because their joint return entitled them to a
higher credit than was the case had they filed separately, given the eligibility
and phase-out levels of the credit at the time of their study. Contrarily
however, a two-eamer couple with children and $35,000 of combined income
was ineligible for the EITC if married, but eligible for a sizable credit if they
did not marry, lived together, and raised a family. Although these two latter
couples had similar income and family responsibilities, they were not treated
the same under the tax code, violating the principle of horizontal equity. Many
of the compliance problems that the IRS faced and that were addressed in
the aforementioned legislation during the mid-to-later 1990s were a function
of the same issue, namely the relative treatment of single and married taxpayers. Achieving marriage neutrality, progressiveness, and equal taxation of
couples with the same income was (and remains) a longstanding tax problem
(Bittker, 1975). Finally, it should also be kept in mind that 14 states and the
District of Columbia had also implemented their own EITC programs by
2000, adding between 5-25 percent more credit on top of the Federal one, and
that these were not taken into account in the present study of the Federal
program (Johnson & Lazere, 1998). For exemplary studies that did account
for state EITC programs, see Neumark and Wascher (2001) and Scholz (1995).

